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Page 236.01
The Two Truths Debate
Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the Middle Way
by Sonam Thakchoe
Foreword by Jay L. Garfield
Nov 2007
Trade Paper
$22.95 US
($29.95 CAN)
978-0-86171-501-5 | 9780861715015
0-86171-501-2 | 0861715012
352 pp
24 per carton
Philosophy & Spirituality
RELIGION
Buddhism/Tibetan
Spring 2007
Imprint Rights: W* (excludes United Kingdom & Ireland, Australia & New Zealand)
Title Rights: W
Product Safety: Information Not Available
Published by
Wisdom Publications
Description:
The Middle Way is a central idea for all Buddhists, yet its definition varies across Buddhist cultures. In Tibetan Buddhism, the interpretation of what are called the two truths — the truth of conventional appearances and the ultimate truth of emptiness — is especially contentious. This comparative analysis examines the differing approaches toward the Middle Way taken by the two great Buddhist scholars, Tsongkhapa and Gorampa. It demonstrates how philosophical positions have dramatic implications both for how one approaches Buddhist practice and for how one ultimately understands enlightenment itself.
Excerpt:
Introduction
The buddhas’ teachings of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly conventions and an ultimate truth.
—Nagarjuna
The objectives and scope of the book
The primary objective of this book is to interrogate the age-old controversy over the two truths doctrine and to demonstrate that the Tibetan Pr›saºgika Madhyamaka tradition offers at least two radically distinct epistemological, ontological, and soteriological approaches concerning the doctrine, with a view to explaining the nature of the distinction between those accounts. The book not only has implications for the understanding of the two figures that are the focus of discussion, but also for the broader understanding of Tibetan philosophy in general.
The approaches at issue here are those associated with the Tibetan M›dhyamikas Tsongkhapa Lobsang Dragpa (1357–1419) and Gorampa Sönam Senge (1429–89). The book is a comparative analysis of their conceptions of the two truths—their respective understandings of the definitions of the two truths, the relationship between the two truths, the ontological status of the two truths, the epistemic resources for accessing the two truths, the problems concerning the limits of language and thought as these relate to the notion of ultimate truth, the different ways of realizing ultimate truth, and, finally, the nature and possibility of knowledge of the two truths and the implications of such knowledge for the attainment of enlightenment. Through a comparative analysis of Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on these issues, the manuscript demonstrates where, why, and how the two Tibetan readings of the original Indian sources exhibit distinct and independent characters.
While I do not attempt to adjudicate which of the two readings gets the Indian sources right, I do often juxtapose the two readings against some of the more obvious assertions made by the founding fathers of the tradition—such as the Buddha, or Nagarjuna.
Chapter 1 compares Tsongkhapa’s and Gorampa’s responses to three principal questions: What is divided into the two truths? How are they related? Are there two actual truths or just one truth? Examining his works in light of these questions reveals Tsongkhapa as a pluralist. For him the two truths are actual truths. Conventional truth and ultimate truth are mutually interlocking, with no hierarchical relation between them. Both truths are equal in their ontological, epistemological, and even soteriological importance. Gorampa, on the other hand, is a monist. Conventional truth, according to him, is not actual truth. Ultimate truth alone is the truth. Thus the two truths are distinct, hierarchically ordered, and mutually exclusive. Ultimate truth precedes conventional truth in its ontological, epistemological, and soteriological importance.
Chapter 2 compares the two Prasangika Madhyamikas’ interpretations of how the two truths are defined. For Tsongkhapa, definitions of the two truths are based on the two natures that are verified by, respectively, empirically valid and ultimately valid cognition. Tsongkhapa, however, does not simply reduce the two truths to these two modes of cognition; ultimate truth in particular, he says, cannot be metaphysically unconditioned—reducible to an independent and ultimate mode of cognition—even though it may be unconditioned epistemologically. For Gorampa, ignorance and wisdom respectively determine the character, and therefore the definition, of each of the two truths. The two truths are thus underlaid by, and reducible to, two conflicting modes of cognition. Ultimate truth is therefore unconditioned metaphysically—it is defined by an independent and ultimate mode of cognition.
Chapter 3 compares Tsongkhapa’s and Gorampa’s positions on the limits of language and conceptual thought. For Tsongkhapa ultimate truth is, to a certain extent, both effable and conceptually knowable, while for Gorampa it is ineffable and conceptually unknowable. Tsongkhapa argues for the possibility of valid conceptual cognition, therefore, and Gorampa’s argues against it.
Chapter 4 compares Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the three principal modes of knowing ultimate truth: by way of not seeing it; by way of transcending conceptual elaborations; and by way of ascending to nonduality. Tsongkhapa mobilizes all three of these modes of knowing ultimate truth to establish that empirically given phenomena (those accessible to the senses) are without essence and thus dependently arisen. He then proceeds to argue that transcendent knowledge is equivalent to knowledge of empirical phenomena in being dependently arisen. Gorampa, on the other hand, mobilizes the three modes of knowing ultimate truth as epistemological scaffolding that allows one to ascend to a metaphysical nonduality. Ttranscendent knowledge, he argues, is utterly distinct from conventional knowledge. Thus the knowledge of empirically given phenomena as dependently arisen and the knowledge of transcendent ultimate truth as nondual must be distinct and contradictory.
Chapter 5 looks at the unique features of enlightened knowledge—the way a buddha’s mind works. This is where the disagreement between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa reaches its climax. Tsongkhapa argues that enlightenment is the perfection of knowledge of empirically given phenomena from both empirical and ultimate standpoints. Thus the two truths—and their two modes of knowing—are united in a perfect equilibrium. For Gorampa enlightenment represents a breach between the two truths, for with enlightenment the conventional world and conventional knowledge disappear, and one is conscious only of a transcendent absolute.
The sixth and final chapter concludes with a discussion of the four main philosophical themes: soteriology, ontology, epistemology, and ethics.
Why Compare Tsongkhapa and Gorampa?
Tsongkhapa and Gorampa are two of the most widely read and respected figures within Tibetan philosophy. Each systematically formulated a complete Buddhist epistemological, ontological, and soteriological agenda based on their understandings of Indian Madhyamaka. Both rank the Prasangika Madhyamaka as the most profound of all Buddhist philosophical schools. And, most importantly, despite both claiming that their views are Prasangika Madhyamaka, their views are philosophically and hermeneutically distinct.
Tsongkhapa is the founder of the Gelug order of Tibetan Buddhism. He wrote extensively on Madhyamaka philosophy. His Lam rim chen mo (Great Stages of the Path) and Essence of Eloquent Teachings are widely recognized as his two most illustrious works. His Illumination of the Middle Way, a commentary on the Madhyamak›vat›ra of Candrakirti, and his Ocean of Reasoning, a commentary on the MÒlamadhyamakak›rik› of Nagarjuna, are the most celebrated of his commentarial works.
Gorampa is a pillar of the Sakya school. Although not the founder oof the Sakya order, his writings receive more attention than almost all other scholars of this tradition. In academic institutions affiliated with the Sakya school, Gorampa’s writings are compulsory textbooks. His most highly regarded writings include the two independent works, Distinguishing Views and Window on the Definitive Meaning. Among his commentaries are Illuminating the View, his commentary on Nagarjuna's MÒlamadhyamakak›rik›, this commentary on Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara.
In their respective schools of thought, Tsongkhapa and Gorampa are recognized as impeccable interpreters of Nagarjuna’s philosophy as transmitted through Candrakirti. However, from the perspective of the other’s school, the position of each is viewed as thoroughly problematic. A succession of Tibetan scholars have raised serious and fierce objections against Tsongkhapa’s position on the doctrine of the two truths. Likewise, others have vehemently defended Tsongkhapa’s interpretation while rejecting that of Gorampa. My aim here is to venture an in-depth analysis of how,
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